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1 Introduction
Cognitive linguistics is a modern school of linguistic thought and practice. It is con-
cerned with investigating the relationship between human language, the mind and 
socio-physical experience. It originally emerged in the 1970s (Fillmore, 1975; Lakof  & 
h ompson, 1975; Rosch, 1975) and arose out of dissatisfaction with formal approaches 
to language which were dominant, at that time, in the disciplines of linguistics and 
philosophy. While its origins were, in part, philosophical in nature, cognitive linguistics 
has always been strongly inl uenced by theories and i ndings from the other cognitive 
sciences as they emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly cognitive psychology. 2 
Nowhere is this clearer than in work relating to human categorization, particularly as 
adopted by Charles Fillmore in the 1970s (e.g., Fillmore, 1975) and George Lakof  in 
the 1980s (e.g., Lakof , 1987). Also of importance have been earlier traditions such 
as Gestalt psychology, as applied notably by Leonard Talmy (e.g., 2000) and Ronald 
Langacker (e.g., 1987). Finally, the neural underpinnings of language and cognition have 
had longstanding inl uence on the character and content of cognitive linguistic theories, 
from early work on how visual biology constrains colour term systems (Kay & McDaniel, 
1978) to more recent work under the rubric of the Neural h eory of Language (Gallese 
& Lakof , 2005). In recent years, cognitive linguistic theories have become sui  ciently 
sophisticated and detailed to begin making predictions that are testable using the broad 
range of converging methods from the cognitive sciences.
Early research was dominated in the 1970s and early 1980s by a relatively small 
number of scholars, primarily (although not exclusively) situated on the western sea-
board of the United States. 3 During the 1980s, cognitive linguistic research began to take 
root in northern continental Europe, particularly in Belgium, Holland and Germany. 
By the early 1990s, there was a growing proliferation of research in cognitive linguistics 
throughout Europe and North America, and a relatively large internationally-distrib-
uted group of researchers who identii ed themselves as ‘cognitive linguists’. h is led, 
in 1989, with a major conference held at Duisburg, Germany, to the formation of the 
International Cognitive Linguistics Association, together with, a year later, the founda-
tion of the journal Cognitive Linguistics. In the words of one of the earliest pioneers in 
cognitive linguistics, Ronald Langacker (1991b, p. xv), this event ‘marked the birth of 
cognitive linguistics as a broadly grounded, self conscious intellectual movement.’
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Cognitive linguistics is best described as a ‘movement’ or an ‘enterprise’, precisely 
because it does not constitute a single closely-articulated theory. Instead, it is an approach 
that has adopted a common set of core commitments and guiding principles, which 
have led to a diverse range of complementary, overlapping (and sometimes competing) 
theories. h e purpose of this article is to trace some of the major assumptions and 
commitments that make cognitive linguistics a distinct and worthwhile enterprise. We 
also attempt to briel y survey the major areas of research and theory construction which 
characterize cognitive linguistics, areas which make it one of the most lively, exciting 
and promising schools of thought and practice in modern cognitive science. 4
2 Two key commitments of cognitive linguistics
h e cognitive linguistics enterprise is characterized by two fundamental commitments 
(Lakof , 1990). h ese underlie both the orientation and approach adopted by practis-
ing cognitive linguists, and the assumptions and methodologies employed in the two 
main branches of the cognitive linguistics enterprise: cognitive semantics, and cognitive 
approaches to grammar, discussed in further detail in later sections.
2.1 The Generalization Commitment
h e i rst key commitment is the Generalization Commitment (Lakof , 1990). It represents 
a dedication to characterizing general principles that apply to all aspects of human 
language. h is goal is just a special subcase of the standard commitment in science 
to seek the broadest generalizations possible. In contrast to the cognitive linguistics 
approach, other approaches to the study of language ot en separate the language fac-
ulty into distinct areas such as phonology (sound), semantics (word and sentence 
meaning), pragmatics (meaning in discourse context), morphology (word structure), 
syntax (sentence structure), and so on. As a consequence, there is ot en little basis for 
generalization across these aspects of language, or for study of their interrelations. h is 
is particularly true of formal linguistics.
Formal linguistics attempts to model language by positing explicit mechanical 
devices or procedures operating on theoretical primitives in order to produce all the 
possible grammatical sentences of a given language. Such approaches typically attempt 
precise formulations by adopting formalisms inspired by computer science, mathematics 
and logic. Formal linguistics is embodied most notably by the work of Noam Chomsky 
(e.g., 1965, 1981, 1995) and the paradigm of Generative Grammar, as well as the tradition 
known as Formal Semantics, inspired by philosopher of language Richard Montague 
(1970, 1973; see Cann, 1993, for a review).
Within formal linguistics it is usually argued that areas such as phonology, semantics 
and syntax concern signii cantly dif erent kinds of structuring principles operating 
over dif erent kinds of primitives. For instance, a syntax ‘module’ is an area in the mind 
concerned with structuring words into sentences, whereas a phonology ‘module’ is 
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concerned with structuring sounds into patterns permitted by the rules of any given 
language, and by human language in general. h is modular view of mind reinforces the 
idea that modern linguistics is justii ed in separating the study of language into distinct 
sub-disciplines, not only on grounds of practicality, but because the components of 
language are wholly distinct, and, in terms of organization, incommensurable.
Cognitive linguists acknowledge that it may ot en be useful to treat areas such 
as syntax, semantics and phonology as being notionally distinct. However, given the 
Generalization Commitment, cognitive linguists do not start with the assumption 
that the ‘modules’ or ‘subsystems’ of language are organized in signii cantly divergent 
ways, or indeed that wholly distinct modules even exist. h us, the Generalization 
Commitment represents a commitment to openly investigating how the various aspects 
of linguistic knowledge emerge from a common set of human cognitive abilities upon 
which they draw, rather than assuming that they are produced in encapsulated modules 
of the mind.
h e Generalization Commitment has concrete consequences for studies of language. 
First, cognitive linguistic studies focus on what is common among aspects of language, 
seeking to re-use successful methods and explanations across these aspects. For instance, 
just as word meaning displays prototype ef ects – there are better and worse examples 
of referents of given words, related in particular ways – so various studies have applied 
the same principles to the organization of morphology (e.g., Taylor, 2003), syntax (e.g., 
Goldberg, 1995), and phonology (e.g., Jaeger & Ohala, 1984). Generalizing successful 
explanations across domains of language isn’t just a good scientii c practice – it is also the 
way biology works; reusing existing structures for new purposes, both on evolutionary 
and developmental timescales. Second, cognitive linguistic approaches ot en take a 
‘vertical’, rather than a ‘horizontal’ approach to the study of language. Language can 
be seen as composed of a set of distinct layers of organization – the sound structure, 
the set of words composed by these sounds, the syntactic structures these words are 
constitutive of, and so on. If we array these layers one on top of the next as they unroll 
over time (like layers of a cake), then modular approaches are horizontal, in the sense 
that they take one layer and study it internally – just as a horizontal slice of cake. Vertical 
approaches get a richer view of language by taking a vertical slice of language, which 
includes phonology, morphology, syntax, and of course a healthy dollop of semantics 
on top. A vertical slice of language is necessarily more complex in some ways than a 
horizontal one – it is more varied and textured – but at the same time it af ords possible 
explanations that are simply unavailable from a horizontal, modular perspective.
2.2 The Cognitive Commitment
h e second commitment is termed the Cognitive Commitment (Lakof , 1990). It 
represents a commitment to providing a characterization of the general principles 
for language that accord with what is known about the mind and brain from other 
disciplines. It is this commitment that makes cognitive linguistics cognitive, and thus 
an approach which is fundamentally interdisciplinary in nature.
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Just as the Generalization Commitment leads to the search for principles of language 
structure that hold across all aspects of language, in a related manner, the Cognitive 
Commitment represents the view that principles of linguistic structure should rel ect 
what is known about human cognition from the other cognitive and brain sciences, 
particularly psychology, artii cial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy. In 
other words, the Cognitive Commitment asserts that models of language and linguistic 
organization proposed should rel ect what is known about the human mind, rather than 
purely aesthetic dictates such as the use of particular kinds of formalisms or economy 
of representation (see Crot , 1998, for discussion of this last point).
h e Cognitive Commitment has a number of concrete ramii cations. First, linguistic 
theories cannot include structures or processes that violate known properties of the 
human cognitive system. For instance, if sequential derivation of syntactic structures 
violates time constraints provided by actual human language processing, then it must 
be jettisoned. Second, models that use known, existing properties of human cognition 
to explain language phenomena are more parsimonious than those that are built from 
a priori simplicity metrics. For example, quite a lot is known about human categoriza-
tion, and a theory that reduces word meaning to the same mechanisms responsible 
for categorization in other cognitive domains is simpler than one that hypothesizes 
a separate system for capturing lexical semantics. Finally, it is incumbent upon the 
cognitive linguistic researcher to i nd convergent evidence for the cognitive reality of 
components of any prof ered model or explanation – whether or not this research is 
conducted by the cognitive linguist (Gibbs, to appear/this volume).
3 Cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar
Having briel y set out the two key commitments of the cognitive linguistics enterprise, 
we now briel y map out the two, hitherto, best developed areas of the i eld.
Cognitive linguistics practice can be roughly divided into two main areas of research: 
cognitive semantics and cognitive (approaches to) grammar. h e area of study known as 
cognitive semantics is concerned with investigating the relationship between experience, 
the conceptual system, and the semantic structure encoded by language. In specii c 
terms, scholars working in cognitive semantics investigate knowledge representation 
(conceptual structure), and meaning construction (conceptualization). Cognitive seman-
ticists have employed language as the lens through which these cognitive phenomena 
can be investigated. Consequently, research in cognitive semantics tends to be interested 
in modelling the human mind as much as it is concerned with investigating linguistic 
semantics. A cognitive approach to grammar is concerned with modelling the language 
system (the mental ‘grammar’), rather than the nature of mind per se. However, it does 
so by taking as its starting point the conclusions of work in cognitive semantics. h is 
follows as meaning is central to cognitive approaches to grammar. 5 It is critical to note 
that although the study of cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar are 
occasionally separate in practice, this by no means implies that their domains of enquiry 
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are anything but tightly linked –most work in cognitive linguistics i nds it necessary to 
investigate both lexical semantics and grammatical organization jointly.
As with research in cognitive semantics, cognitive approaches to grammar have 
also typically adopted one of two foci. Scholars such as Ronald Langacker (e.g., 1987, 
1991a, 1991b, 1999) have emphasized the study of the cognitive principles that give rise 
to linguistic organization. In his theory of Cognitive Grammar, Langacker has attempted 
to delineate the principles that structure a grammar, and to relate these to aspects of 
general cognition.
h e second avenue of investigation, pursued by researchers including Fillmore 
and Kay (Fillmore et al., 1988; Kay & Fillmore, 1998), Lakof  (Lakof  & h ompson, 
1975; Lakof , 1987) Goldberg (1995, 2003/this volume) and more recently Bergen and 
Chang (2005/this volume) and Crot  (2002), aims to provide a more descriptively and 
formally detailed account of the linguistic units that comprise a particular language. 
h ese researchers attempt to provide a broad-ranging inventory of the units of language, 
from morphemes to words, idioms, and phrasal patterns, and seek accounts of their 
structure, compositional possibilities, and relations. Researchers who have pursued 
this line of investigation are developing a set of theories that are collectively known as 
construction grammars. h is general approach takes its name from the view in cognitive 
linguistics that the basic unit of language is a form-meaning pairing known as a symbolic 
assembly, or a construction (particularly in construction grammar accounts, see, e.g., 
Goldberg, 1995, for discussion).
4 Cognitive semantics: guiding principles
In this section we consider in a little more detail the i rst of these two best-developed 
areas of cognitive linguistics. Cognitive semantics, like the larger enterprise of which it 
is a part, is not a single unii ed framework. h ose researchers who identify themselves 
as cognitive semanticists typically have a diverse set of foci and interests. However, there 
are a number of guiding principles that collectively characterize a cognitive approach 
to semantics. In this section we identify these guiding principles (as we see them). In 
Section 5 we explore some of the major theories and research areas which have emerged 
under the ‘banner’ of cognitive semantics.
h e four guiding principles of cognitive semantics are as follows:
i) Conceptual structure is embodied (the ‘embodied cognition thesis’).
ii) Semantic structure is conceptual structure.
iii) Meaning representation is encyclopaedic.
iv) Meaning construction is conceptualization.
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4.1 Conceptual structure is embodied
Due to the nature of our bodies, including our neuro-anatomical architecture, we have 
a species-specii c view of the world. In other words, our construal of ‘reality’ is medi-
ated, in large measure, by the nature of our embodiment. One example of the way in 
which embodiment af ects the nature of experience is in the realm of colour. While the 
human visual system has three kinds of photoreceptors (i.e., colour channels), other 
organisms ot en have a dif erent number (Varela et al., 1991). For instance, the visual 
system of squirrels, rabbits and possibly cats, makes use of two colour channels, while 
other organisms, including goldi sh and pigeons, have four colour channels. Having a 
dif erent range of colour channels af ects our experience of colour in terms of the range 
of colours accessible to us along the colour spectrum. Some organisms can see in the 
infrared range, such as rattlesnakes, which hunt prey at night and can visually detect the 
heat given of  by other organisms. Humans are unable to see in this range. h e nature 
of our visual apparatus – one aspect of our embodiment – determines the nature and 
range of our visual experience.
h e nature of the relation between embodied cognition and linguistic meaning 
is contentious. It is evident that embodiment underspecii es which colour terms a 
particular language will have, and whether the speakers of a given language will be 
interested in ‘colour’ in the i rst place (Saunders, 1995; Wierzbicka, 1996). However, the 
interest in understanding this relation is an important aspect of the view in cognitive 
linguistics that the study of linguistic meaning construction needs to be reintegrated 
with the contemporary study of human nature (e.g., Núñez & Freeman, 1999).
h e fact that our experience is embodied – that is, structured in part by the nature 
of the bodies we have and by our neurological organization – has consequences for 
cognition. In other words, the concepts we have access to and the nature of the ‘reality’ 
we think and talk about are a function of our embodiment. We can only talk about what 
we can perceive and conceive, and the things that we can perceive and conceive derive 
from embodied experience. From this point of view, the human mind must bear the 
imprint of embodied experience. h is thesis, central to cognitive semantics, is known 
as the thesis of embodied cognition. h is position holds that conceptual structure (the 
nature of human concepts) is a consequence of the nature of our embodiment and thus 
is embodied.
4.2 Semantic structure is conceptual structure
h e second guiding principle asserts that language refers to concepts in the mind of 
the speaker rather than, directly, to entities which inhere in an objectively real external 
world. In other words, semantic structure (the meanings conventionally associated with 
words and other linguistic units) can be equated with conceptual structure (i.e., concepts). 
h is ‘representational’ view is directly at odds with the ‘denotational’ perspective of 
what cognitive semanticists sometimes refer to as objectivist semantics, as exemplii ed 
by some formal approaches to semantics.
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However, the claim that semantic structure can be equated with conceptual structure 
does not mean that the two are identical. Instead, cognitive semanticists claim that the 
meanings associated with linguistic units such as words, for example, form only a subset of 
possible concepts. At er all, we have many more thoughts, ideas and feelings than we can 
conventionally encode in language. For example, as Langacker (1987) observes, we have a 
concept for the place on our faces below our nose and above our mouth where moustaches 
go. We must have a concept for this part of the face in order to understand that the hair that 
grows there is called a moustache. However, there is no English word that conventionally 
encodes this concept (at least not in the non-specialist vocabulary of everyday language). 
It follows that the set of lexical concepts, the semantic units conventionally associated 
with linguistic units such as words (see Evans, 2004, 2006; Evans & Green, 2006) is only 
a subset of the full set of concepts in the minds of speaker-hearers. 6
4.3 Meaning representation is encyclopaedic
h e third guiding principle holds that semantic structure is encyclopaedic in nature. 
h is means that lexical concepts do not represent neatly packaged bundles of meaning 
(the so-called dictionary view, see Haiman, 1980, for a critique). Rather, they serve as 
‘points of access’ to vast repositories of knowledge relating to a particular concept or 
conceptual domain (e.g., Langacker, 1987).
Of course, to claim that lexical concepts are ‘points of access’ to encyclopaedic 
meaning is not to deny that words have conventional meanings associated with them. 
h e fact that example (1) means something dif erent from example (2) is a consequence 
of the conventional range of meanings associated with sad and happy.
(1)  James is sad.
(2)  James is happy.
Nevertheless, cognitive semanticists argue that the conventional meaning associated with 
a particular linguistic unit is simply a ‘prompt’ for the process of meaning construction: 
the ‘selection’ of an appropriate interpretation against the context of the utterance.
By way of example take the word safe. h is has a range of meanings, and the meaning 
that we select emerges as a consequence of the context in which the word occurs. To 
illustrate this point, consider the examples in (3), discussed by Fauconnier and Turner 
(2002), against the context of a child playing on the beach.
(3) a.  The child is safe.
b.  The beach is safe.
c.  The shovel is safe.
In this context, the interpretation of (3a) is that the child will not come to any harm. 
However, (3b) does not mean that the beach will not come to harm. Instead, it means that 
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the beach is an environment in which the risk of the child coming to harm is minimized. 
Similarly, (3c) does not mean that the shovel will not come to harm, but that it will not 
cause harm to the child. h ese examples illustrate that there is no single i xed property 
that safe assigns to the words child, beach and shovel. In order to understand what the 
speaker means, we draw upon our encyclopaedic knowledge relating to children, beaches 
and shovels, and our knowledge relating to what it means to be safe. We then ‘construct’ 
a meaning by ‘selecting’ a meaning that is appropriate in the context of the utterance.
4.4 Meaning construction is conceptualization
h e fourth guiding principle is that language itself does not encode meaning. Instead, as 
we have seen, words (and other linguistic units) are only ‘prompts’ for the construction of 
meaning. Accordingly, meaning is constructed at the conceptual level. Meaning construc-
tion is equated with conceptualization, a process whereby linguistic units serve as prompts 
for an array of conceptual operations and the recruitment of background knowledge. 
Meaning is a process rather than a discrete ‘thing’ that can be ‘packaged’ by language.
5 Cognitive semantics: major theories and approaches
In this section we briel y introduce some of the most signii cant theories in cognitive 
semantics, and consider how they best exemplify the guiding assumptions discussed 
above.
5.1 Image schema theory
h e theoretical construct of the image schema was developed in particular by Mark 
Johnson. In his now classic 1987 book, h e Body in the Mind, Johnson proposed that 
one way in which embodied experience manifests itself at the cognitive level is in terms 
of image schemas. h ese are rudimentary concepts like contact, container and 
balance, which are meaningful because they derive from and are linked to human pre-
conceptual experience. h is is experience of the world directly mediated and structured 
by the human body. h ese image-schematic concepts are not disembodied abstractions, 
but derive their substance, in large measure, from the sensory-perceptual experiences 
that give rise to them in the i rst place.
h e developmental psychologist Jean Mandler (e.g. 1992, 1996, 2004) has made 
a number of proposals concerning how image schemas might arise from embodied 
experience. Starting at an early age infants attend to objects and spatial displays in their 
environment. Mandler suggests that by attending closely to such spatial experiences, 
children are able to abstract across similar kinds of experiences, i nding meaningful 
patterns in the process. For instance, the container image schema is more than simply 
a spatio-geometric representation. It is a ‘theory’ about a particular kind of coni guration 
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in which one entity is supported by another entity that contains it. In other words, the 
container schema is meaningful because containers are meaningful in our everyday 
experience.
Lakof  (1987, 1990, 1993/this volume) and Johnson (1987) have argued that rudi-
mentary embodied concepts of this kind provide the conceptual building blocks for 
more complex concepts, and can be systematically extended to provide structure to 
more abstract concepts and conceptual domains. According to this view, the reason we 
can talk about being in states like love or trouble (4) is because abstract concepts like 
love are structured and therefore understood by virtue of the fundamental concept 
container. In this way, image-schematic concepts serve to structure more complex 
concepts and ideas.
(4)  a. James is in love.
b. Susan is in trouble.
c. The government is in a deep crisis.
According to Johnson, it is precisely because containers constrain activity that it makes 
sense to conceptualize power and all-encompassing states like love or crisis in terms 
of the container schema.
Mandler (2004) describes the process of forming image schemas in terms of a 
redescription of spatial experience via a process she labels perceptual meaning analysis. 
As she notes, ‘[O]ne of the foundations of the conceptualizing capacity is the image 
schema, in which spatial structure is mapped into conceptual structure’ (Mandler, 
1992, p. 591). She further suggests that ‘Basic, recurrent experiences with the world 
form the bedrock of the child’s semantic architecture, which is already established well 
before the child begins producing language’ (Mandler, 1992, p. 597). In other words, it 
is experience, meaningful to us by virtue of our embodiment, that forms the basis of 
many of our most fundamental concepts. Again, this basis must be very broad, and it 
underspecii es the semantic spatial categories that children acquire (see Bowerman & 
Choi, 2003/this volume). Nevertheless, image schema theory represents an important 
attempt to relate conceptual structure to the nature of embodiment. h us, it most 
transparently rel ects the thesis of embodied cognition, and the i rst guiding principle 
of cognitive semantics which holds that conceptual structure is embodied.
5.2 Encyclopaedic semantics
h e traditional view in formal linguistics holds that meaning can be divided into a 
dictionary component and an encyclopaedic component. According to this view, it is 
only the dictionary component that properly constitutes the study of lexical semantics: 
the branch of semantics concerned with the study of word meaning. In contrast, ency-
clopaedic knowledge is external to linguistic knowledge, falling within the domain of 
‘world knowledge’. Of course, this view is consistent with the modularity hypothesis 
adopted within formal linguistics, briel y mentioned earlier.
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In contrast, cognitive semanticists typically adopt an encyclopaedic approach to 
meaning. h ere are a number of assumptions which constitute this approach to seman-
tics, which we briel y outline here.
i) h ere is no principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics.
ii) Encyclopaedic knowledge is structured.
iii)  Encyclopaedic meaning emerges in context.
iv)  Lexical items are points of access to encyclopaedic knowledge.
v)  Encyclopaedic knowledge is dynamic.
i)  There is no principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics
First, cognitive semanticists reject the idea that there is a principled distinction between 
‘core’ meaning on the one hand, and pragmatic, social or cultural meaning on the 
other. h is means that cognitive semanticists do not make a sharp distinction between 
semantic and pragmatic knowledge. Knowledge of what words mean and knowledge 
about how words are used are both types of ‘semantic’ knowledge.
Cognitive semanticists do not posit an autonomous mental lexicon which con-
tains semantic knowledge separately from other kinds of (linguistic or non-linguistic) 
knowledge. It follows that there is no distinction between dictionary knowledge and 
encyclopaedic knowledge: there is only encyclopaedic knowledge, which subsumes 
what we might think of as dictionary knowledge.
ii)  Encyclopaedic knowledge is structured
h e view that there is only encyclopaedic knowledge does not entail that the knowledge 
we have connected to any given word is a disorganized mess. Cognitive semanticists 
view encyclopaedic knowledge as a structured system of knowledge, organized as a 
network. Moreover, not all aspects of the knowledge that is, in principle, accessible by 
a single word has equal standing. For example, what we know about the word mango 
includes information concerning its shape, colour, smell, texture and taste. h is holds 
whether we like or hate mangos, and so on.
iii)  Encyclopaedic meaning emerges in context
Encyclopaedic meaning arises in context(s) of use, so that the ‘selection’ of encyclopaedic 
meaning is informed by contextual factors. For example, recall our discussion of safe 
earlier. We saw that this word can have dif erent meanings depending on the particular 
context of use. Safe can mean ‘unlikely to cause harm’ when used in the context of a child 
playing with a spade. Alternatively safe can mean ‘unlikely to come to harm’, when used 
in the context of a beach that has been saved from development as a tourist resort.
Compared with the dictionary view of meaning, which separates core meaning 
(semantics) from non-core meaning (pragmatics), the encyclopaedic view makes very 
dif erent claims. Not only does semantics include encyclopaedic knowledge, but meaning 
is fundamentally ‘guided’ by context. Furthermore, the meaning of a word is ‘constructed’ 
on line as a result of contextual information. From this perspective, fully-specii ed pre-
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assembled word meanings do not exist, but are selected and formed from encyclopaedic 
knowledge, which is called the semantic potential (Evans, 2006) or purport (Crot  & 
Cruse, 2004; Cruse, 2000) of a lexical item.
iv)  Lexical items are points of access to encyclopaedic knowledge
h e encyclopaedic approach views lexical items as points of access to encyclopaedic 
knowledge (Langacker, 1987). Accordingly, words are not containers that present neat 
pre-packaged bundles of information. Instead, they selectively provide access to par-
ticular parts of the vast network of encyclopaedic knowledge.
v)  Encyclopaedic knowledge is dynamic
Finally, while the central meaning associated with a word is relatively stable, the ency-
clopaedic knowledge that each word provides access to is dynamic. Consider the lexical 
concept car. Our knowledge of cars continues to be modii ed as a result of our ongoing 
interaction with cars, our acquisition of knowledge regarding cars, and so on (see 
Barsalou, e.g., 1999).
h ere are two relatively well developed theories of encyclopaedic semantics. h e 
i rst is the theory of frame semantics, developed in a series of publications by Charles 
Fillmore (e.g., 1975, 1977, 1982, 1985; Fillmore & Atkins, 1992). A second theory is the 
theory of domains developed by Ronald Langacker (e.g., 1987).
Fillmore proposes that a semantic frame is a schematization of experience (a 
knowledge structure), which is represented at the conceptual level, and held in long-
term memory. h e frame relates the elements and entities associated with a particular 
culturally embedded scene from human experience. h us, a word cannot be understood 
independently of the frame with which it is associated.
Langacker’s (e.g., 1987) theory of domains (like Fillmore’s theory of Frame 
Semantics), is based on the assumption that meaning is encyclopaedic, and that lexical 
concepts cannot be understood independently of larger knowledge structures. Langacker 
calls these knowledge structures domains.
5.3 Categorization and Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs)
A third important theoretical development in cognitive semantics relates to George 
Lakof ’s theory of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs), developed in his now classic 
1987 book Women, Fire and Dangerous h ings. Like Fillmore’s notion of a semantic 
frame, and Langacker’s domains, ICMs are relatively stable background knowledge 
structures with respect to which lexical concepts are relativized. However, Lakof ’s 
account was less concerned with developing an approach to encyclopaedic semantics 
than with addressing issues in categorization which emerged from developments in 
cognitive psychology.
In the 1970s the classical theory of human categorization – so called because it had 
endured since the time of the ancient Greek philosophers– was called into question. h e 
Press Final 27 July 2007
 THE COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS ENTERPRISE: AN OVERVIEW 13
new ideas that contributed to this development emerged from the research of Eleanor 
Rosch and her colleagues on prototypes and basic level category research (e.g., Rosch, 
1975, 1977, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976). Rosch’s work on categoriza-
tion, known as prototype theory, was, in fact, less a theory of knowledge representation 
than a series of i ndings which provided new insights into human categorization. In so 
far as the i ndings led to a theory, Rosch proposed that humans categorize not by means 
of the necessary and sui  cient conditions of the classical theory but with reference to a 
prototype, a relatively abstract mental representation that assembles the key attributes 
or features that best represent instances of a given category.
h e claim that categories are structured with respect to prototypes, or cognitive 
reference points, was based on a number of experimental i ndings. Two of the most 
striking relate to the notion that many categories appear to have fuzzy boundaries, 
and the related notion of typicality ef ects. In terms of fuzziness, consider the category 
furniture. While table and chair are clearly instances of this category, it is less clear 
whether carpet should be considered a member. Rather than having sharply delineated 
boundaries as predicted by the classical view, human subjects ot en appear to have 
dii  culty judging in which categories various physical artefacts belong. Moreover, this 
dii  culty is inl uenced by context, such as the physical situation or how the object in 
question is being used at a given time.
A related issue concerns the notion of prototype or typicality ef ects. For example, 
while people judge table or chair as ‘good examples’ of the category furniture, 
carpet is judged as a less good example. h ese asymmetries between category members 
are called typicality ef ects.
Despite Rosch’s early claim that conceptual fuzziness and typicality ef ects are the 
result of conceptual prototypes, in later work she retreated from this position.
‘h e fact that prototypicality is reliably rated and is correlated with category struc-
ture does not have clear implications for particular processing models nor for a theory 
of cognitive representations of categories’. (Rosch, 1978: 261).
In other words, while typicality ef ects are ‘real’ in the sense that they are empirical 
i ndings, it does not follow that these i ndings can be directly ‘translated’ into a theory 
of how categories are represented in the human mind. Lakof  (1987) represents an 
important attempt to develop a theory of cognitive models that might plausibly explain 
the typicality ef ects uncovered by Rosch and her colleagues.
Lakof  argued that categorization relates to idealized cognitive models (ICMs). h ese 
are relatively stable mental representations that represent ‘theories’ about the world. 
Moreover, ICMs guide cognitive processes like categorization and reasoning. Lakof  
argues that typicality ef ects can arise in a range of ways from a number of dif erent 
sources. One way in which typicality ef ects can arise is due to mismatches between 
ICMs against which particular concepts are understood.
Consider the ICM to which the concept bachelor relates. h is ICM is likely to 
include information relating to the institution of marriage, and a standard marriage-
able age. It is with respect to this ICM, Lakof  argues, that the notion of bachelor is 
understood. Furthermore, because the background frame dei ned by an ICM is idealized, 
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it may only partially match up with other cognitive models. h is can therefore give rise 
to typicality ef ects.
Consider the Pope with respect to the category bachelor. While an individual’s 
status as a bachelor is an ‘all or nothing’ af air, because this notion is understood with 
respect to the legal institution of marriage, the Pope, while strictly speaking a bachelor, 
is judged to be a poor example of this particular category. Lakof ’s theory accounts 
for this sort of typicality ef ect as follows. h e concept pope is primarily understood 
with respect to the ICM of the catholic church, whose clergy are unable to marry. 
Clearly, there is a mismatch between these two cognitive models. In the ICM against 
which bachelor is understood, the Pope is ‘strictly speaking’ a bachelor, because he is 
unmarried. However, the Pope is not a prototypical bachelor because the Pope is more 
frequently understood with respect to a catholic church ICM in which marriage of 
Catholic clergy is prohibited.
h ere are a number of other ways in which, according to Lakof , typicality ef ects 
arise, by virtue of the sorts of ICMs people have access to. For instance, a typicality 
ef ect arises when an exemplar (an individual instance) stands for an entire category. 
h e phenomenon whereby one conceptual entity stands for another is called metonymy, 
discussed later. h us, typicality ef ects that arise in this way relate to what Lakof  refers 
to as metonymic ICMs.
An example of a metonymic ICM is the cultural stereotype housewife-mother, in 
which a married woman does not have paid work, but stays at home and looks at er the 
house and family. h e housewife-mother stereotype can give rise to typicality ef ects 
when it stands for, or represents, the category mother as a whole. Typicality ef ects arise 
from resulting expectations associated with members of the category mother. According 
to the housewife-mother stereotype, mothers nurture their children, and in order to 
do this they stay at home and take care of them. A working mother, by contrast, is not 
simply a mother who has a job, but also one who does not stay at home to look at er her 
children. Hence, the housewife-mother model, by metonymically representing the 
category mother as a whole, serves in part to dei ne other instances of the category such as 
working mother, which thus emerges as a non-prototypical member of the category.
Lakof ’s work on ICMs is important in a number of respects. For instance, it embod-
ies the two key commitments of cognitive linguistics: the Generalization Commitment 
and the Cognitive Commitment. Lakof  took what was then a relatively new set of 
i ndings from cognitive psychology and sought to develop a model of language that 
was compatible with these i ndings. In attempting to model principles of language in 
terms of i ndings from cognitive psychology, Lakof  found himself devising and applying 
principles that were common both to linguistic and conceptual phenomena, which thus 
laid important foundations for the cognitive approach to language.
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5.4 Cognitive lexical semantics
One important consequence of Lakof ’s theory of ICMs was the impetus it provided to 
the cognitive semantic treatment of word-meaning, an area known as cognitive lexical 
semantics. Cognitive lexical semantics takes the position that lexical items (words) are 
conceptual categories; a word represents a category of distinct yet related meanings that 
exhibit typicality ef ects. h us, Lakof  argued, words are categories that can be modelled 
and investigated using the theory of ICMs. In particular, Lakof  argued that lexical items 
represent the type of complex categories he calls radial categories. A radial category is 
structured with respect to a prototype, and the various category members are related 
to the prototype by convention, rather than being ‘generated’ by predictable rules. As 
such, word meanings are stored in the mental lexicon as highly complex structured 
categories of meanings or senses.
In this section, we briel y present Lakof ’s account of the semantics of over, which has 
been highly inl uential in the development of cognitive lexical semantics. Lakof ’s account 
was based on ideas proposed in a master’s thesis by Claudia Brugman, his former student. 
h e idea underpinning Lakof ’s approach was that a lexical item like over constitutes a 
conceptual category of distinct but related (polysemous) senses. Furthermore, these senses, 
as part of a single category, can be judged as more prototypical (central) or less prototypical 
(peripheral). h is means that word senses exhibit typicality ef ects. For instance the above 
sense of over in example (5a) would be judged by most native speakers of English as a 
‘better’ example of over than the control sense in example (5b). While the prototypical 
above sense of over relates to a spatial coni guration, the control sense does not.
(5) a.  The picture is over the mantelpiece.
b.  Jane has a strange power over him.
h e intuition that the spatial meanings are somehow prototypical led Brugman and 
Lakof  (1988), and Lakof  (1987) to argue that the control sense of over is derived 
metaphorically from the more prototypical spatial meaning of over.
While Lakof ’s theory of lexical semantics has been hugely inl uential, there neverthe-
less remain a number of outstanding problems that have attracted signii cant discussion. 
For instance, Lakof ’s so-called ‘full-specii cation’ view has been criticized as it entails a 
potentially vast proliferation of distinct senses for each lexical item (e.g., Sandra, 1998). 
For example, Lakof ’s approach entails that over has, at the very least, several dozen distinct 
senses. A proliferation of senses is not problematic per se, because cognitive linguists are 
not concerned with the issue of economy of representation. However, the absence of clear 
methodological principles for establishing the distinct senses is problematic. More recent 
work (e.g., Tyler & Evans, 2001/this volume, 2003) has sought to address some of the dif-
i culties inherent in Lakof ’s approach by providing a methodology for examining senses 
associated with lexical categories. With the also quite recent use of empirical methods in 
cognitive linguistics (see Cuyckens et al., 1997/this volume), and particularly the use of 
corpora and statistical analysis (e.g., Gries, 2005), cognitive lexical semantics has now begun 
to make serious progress in providing cognitively realistic analyses of lexical categories.
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5.5 Conceptual metaphor theory
Conceptual metaphor theory was one of the earliest and most important theories to take 
a cognitive semantic approach. For a long time in the development of the larger cognitive 
linguistics enterprise it was one of the dominant theories and despite its limitations 
(see Evans, 2004; Evans & Zinken, To appear; Haser, 2005; Leezenberg, 2001; Murphy, 
1996; Stern, 2000; Zinken, Hellsten, & Nerlich, in press), it still remains an important 
perspective.
h e seminal publication is Lakof  and Johnson’s 1980 volume Metaphors we live by, 
the basic premise of which is that metaphor is not simply a stylistic feature of language, 
but that thought itself is fundamentally metaphorical. According to this view, conceptual 
structure is organized by cross domain mappings or correspondences which inhere 
in long term memory. Some of these mappings are due to pre-conceptual embodied 
experiences while others build on these experiences in order to form more complex 
conceptual structures. For instance, we can think and talk about quality in terms of 
vertical elevation, as in (6):
(6) She got a really high mark in the test.
where high relates not literally to physical height but to a good mark.
According to Conceptual Metaphor h eory, this is because the conceptual domain 
quality is conventionally structured and therefore understood in terms of the concep-
tual domain vertical elevation. h e claims made by conceptual metaphor theorists 
like Lakof  and Johnson directly relate to two of the central assumptions associated with 
cognitive semantics. h e i rst is the embodied cognition thesis, and the second is the 
thesis that semantic structure rel ects conceptual structure.
In a more recent development, conceptual metaphors are held to be derived 
from more basic ‘super-schematic’ aspects of conceptual structure known as primary 
metaphors (Grady, 1997; Lakof  & Johnson, 1999). On this view, more culture-specii c 
metaphors such as theories are buildings as exemplii ed by (7):
(7) a. Is that the foundation for your theory?
b. The theory needs more support.
c. The argument is shaky.
are derived from more fundamental, and arguably universal conceptual mappings 
which persist in long-term memory. h e process whereby more foundational primary 
metaphors give rise to more complex or compound metaphors takes place by virtue of 
an integration process known as conceptual blending (Grady et al., 1999/this volume), 
which is discussed further below. h e account of conceptual metaphor as deriving from 
primary metaphors has been further l eshed out in terms of the neural operations that 
could give rise to such cross-domain mappings, as elucidated in great detail by Lakof  
and Johnson (1999).
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5.6 Conceptual metonymy
In Metaphors We Live By, Lakof  and Johnson pointed out that, in addition to meta-
phor, there is a related conceptual mechanism that is also central to human thought 
and language: conceptual metonymy. Like metaphor, metonymy has traditionally been 
analysed as a trope: a purely linguistic device. However, Lakof  and Johnson argued 
that metonymy, like metaphor, was conceptual in nature. In recent years, a considerable 
amount of research has been devoted to metonymy. Indeed, some scholars have begun 
to suggest that metonymy may be more fundamental to conceptual organization than 
metaphor (e.g., Taylor, 2003; Radden, 2001), and some have gone so far as to claim that 
metaphor itself has a metonymic basis (Barcelona, 2001).
To illustrate the phenomenon of metonymy consider the following example drawn 
from Evans and Green (2006):
(8)  The ham sandwich has wandering hands.
Imagine that the sentence in (8) is uttered by one waitress to another in a restaurant. 
h is use of the expression ham sandwich represents an instance of metonymy: two 
entities are associated so that one entity (the item the customer ordered) stands for 
the other (the customer). As this example demonstrates, metonymy is referential in 
nature. It relates to the use of expressions to ‘pinpoint’ entities in order to talk about 
them. h is shows that metonymy functions dif erently from metaphor. For (8) to 
be metaphorical we would need to understand ham sandwich not as an expression 
referring to the customer who ordered it, but in terms of a food item with human 
qualities. As these two quite distinct interpretations show, while metonymy is the 
conceptual relation ‘X stands for Y’, metaphor is the conceptual relation ‘X understood 
in terms of Y’.
A further dei ning feature of metonymy pointed out by Lakof  and Johnson is that 
it is motivated by physical or causal associations. Traditionally, this was expressed in 
terms of contiguity. h is concerns a close or direct relationship between two entities. 
h is explains why the waitress can use the expression the ham sandwich to refer to the 
customer; there is a direct experiential relationship between then ham sandwich and 
the customer who ordered it.
A related way of viewing metonymy is that metonymy is ot en contingent on a 
specii c context. Within a specii c discourse context, a salient vehicle activates and thus 
highlights a particular target (Crot , 1993).
Finally, Lakof  and Turner (1989) added a further component to the cognitive 
semantic view of metonymy. h ey pointed out that metonymy, unlike metaphor, is not a 
cross-domain mapping, but instead allows one entity to stand for another because both 
concepts co-exist within the same domain. h is explains why a metonymic relation-
ship is based on contiguity or conceptual ‘proximity’. h e reason ham sandwich in (8) 
represents an instance of metonymy is because both the target (the customer) and the 
vehicle (the ham sandwich) belong to the same restaurant domain.
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5.7 Mental spaces theory
Mental Spaces h eory is a cognitive theory of meaning construction. Gilles Fauconnier 
developed this approach in his two landmark books Mental Spaces ([1985] 1994), and 
Mappings in h ought and Language (1997). More recently, Fauconnier, in collaboration 
with Mark Turner in a series of papers and a 2002 book, h e way we think, has extended 
this theory, which has given rise to a new framework called Conceptual Blending h eory. 
Together these two theories attempt to provide an account of the ot en hidden conceptual 
aspects of meaning construction. From the perspective of Mental Spaces and Blending 
theory, language provides underspecii ed prompts for the construction of meaning, 
which takes place at the conceptual level. Accordingly, these two theories exemplify 
the fourth of the guiding principles of the cognitive semantics approach. We briel y 
introduce some key notions from Mental Spaces h eory and then in the next section 
briel y survey the more recent Conceptual Blending h eory.
According to Fauconnier, meaning construction involves two processes: (1) the 
building of mental spaces; and (2) the establishment of mappings between those mental 
spaces. Moreover, the mapping relations are guided by the local discourse context, 
which means that meaning construction is always context-bound. Fauconnier dei nes 
mental spaces as ‘partial structures that proliferate when we think and talk, allowing 
a i ne-grained partitioning of our discourse and knowledge structures.’ (Fauconnier, 
1997, p. 11). h e fundamental insight this theory provides is that mental spaces partition 
meaning into distinct conceptual regions or ‘packets’, when we think and talk.
Mental spaces are regions of conceptual space that contain specii c kinds of informa-
tion. h ey are constructed on the basis of generalized linguistic, pragmatic and cultural 
strategies for recruiting information. However, because mental spaces are constructed 
‘on line’, they result in unique and temporary ‘packets’ of conceptual structure, con-
structed for purposes specii c to the ongoing discourse. h e principles of mental space 
formation and the relations or mappings established between mental spaces have the 
potential to yield unlimited meanings.
As linguistic expressions are seen as underdetermined prompts for processes of 
rich meaning construction, linguistic expressions have meaning potential. Rather than 
‘encoding’ meaning, linguistic expressions represent partial building instructions, accord-
ing to which mental spaces are constructed. Of course, the actual meaning prompted 
for by a given utterance will always be a function of the discourse context in which it 
occurs, which entails that the meaning potential of any given utterance will always be 
exploited in dif erent ways dependent upon the discourse context.
Mental spaces are set up by space builders, which are linguistic units that either 
prompt for the construction of a new mental space, or shit  attention back and forth 
between previously constructed mental spaces. Space builders can be expressions like 
prepositional phrases (in 1966, at the shop, in Fred’s mind’s eye), adverbs (really, probably, 
possibly), and subject-verb combinations that are followed by an embedded sentence 
(Fred believes [Mary likes sausages], Mary hopes…, Susan states…), to name but a few. 
Space builders require the hearer to ‘set up’ a scenario beyond the ‘here and now’, whether 
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this scenario rel ects past or future reality, reality in some other location, a hypothetical 
situation, a situation that rel ects ideas and beliefs, and so on.
Mental spaces contain elements, which are either entities constructed on line, 
or pre-existing entities in the conceptual system. Mental spaces are also internally 
structured by existing knowledge structures, including frames and ICMs. h e space 
builders, the elements introduced into a mental space, and the properties and relations 
prompted for, recruit this pre-existing knowledge structure. Once a mental space has 
been constructed, it is linked to the other mental spaces established during discourse. 
As discourse proceeds, mental spaces proliferate within a network or lattice, as more 
background knowledge is recruited and links between the resulting spaces are created. 
One of the advantages of Mental Spaces theory is that it provides an elegant account of 
how viewpoint shit s during discourse, which in turn facilitates an intuitive solution to 
some of the referential problems formal accounts of semantics have wrestled with.
5.8 Conceptual blending theory
In terms of its architecture and in terms of its central concerns, Blending h eory is 
closely related to Mental Spaces h eory. h is is due to its central concern with dynamic 
aspects of meaning construction, and its dependence upon mental spaces and mental 
space construction as part of its architecture. However, Blending h eory is a distinct 
theory that has been developed to account for phenomena that Mental Spaces h eory 
(and Conceptual Metaphor h eory) cannot adequately account for. Moreover, Blending 
h eory adds theoretical sophistication of its own.
h e crucial insight of Blending h eory is that meaning construction typically 
involves integration of structure from across mental spaces, that gives rise to emergent 
structure: structure which is more than the sum of its parts. Blending theorists argue 
that this process of conceptual integration or blending is a general and basic cognitive 
operation, which is central to the way we think.
One of the key claims of cognitive semantics, particularly as developed by con-
ceptual metaphor theorists, is that human imagination plays a crucial role in cognitive 
processes, and in what it is to be human. h is theme is further developed by Gilles 
Fauconnier and Mark Turner, the pioneers of Blending h eory. Blending h eory was 
originally developed in order to account for linguistic structure and for the role of 
language in meaning construction, particularly ‘creative’ aspects of meaning construc-
tion like novel metaphors, counterfactuals, and so on. However, recent research in 
Blending h eory has given rise to the view that conceptual blending is central to human 
thought and imagination, and that evidence for this can be found not only in human 
language, but also in a wide range of other areas of human activity, such as art, literature, 
religious thought and practice, and scientii c endeavour. Fauconnier and Turner also 
argue that our ability to perform conceptual integration or blending may have been the 
key mechanism in facilitating the development of advanced human behaviours that rely 
on complex symbolic abilities. h ese behaviours include rituals, art, tool manufacture 
and use, and language.
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h e mechanism by which dynamic meaning-construction occurs involves, accord-
ing to Fauconnier and Turner, the establishment of an integration network, resulting 
in a blend. Integration networks consist of (at least) two input mental spaces, a generic 
space which serves to identify counterparts in the inputs, and a fourth blended space, 
which provides the novel emergent structure not contained in either of the inputs. h e 
process of blending or integration resulting in the emergent structure contained in the 
blended space involves a process termed compression which reduces the conceptual 
‘distance’ between counterpart elements in the input spaces.
For instance, consider the following example adapted from John Taylor (2002):
(9) In France, Bill Clinton wouldn’t have been harmed by his aff air with Monica Lewinsky.
h is is a complex counterfactual which is achieved by virtue of conceptual blending. 
h e point of the utterance is to set up a disanalogy between what we know about the US 
and the behaviours expected by American voters of their political leaders especially with 
respect to marital i delity, and the behaviours expected by French voters of their political 
leaders. Yet, this disanalogy is achieved by establishing a counterfactual scenario, a 
complex imaginative feat, in order to facilitate inferential work in reality, with respect to 
American and French attitudes to extramarital af airs. Conceptual blending theory, thus, 
represents an ambitious attempt to model the dynamic qualities of meaning-construc-
tion, by extending the theoretical architecture of Mental Spaces theory. Its applications 
are wide-ranging, including, for example, the study of the development and cognitive 
structure of mathematical systems (Lakof  & Núñez, 2000).
6 Cognitive approaches to grammar: guiding principles
Just as we have seen for cognitive semantics, cognitive linguists who study grammar 
typically have a diverse set of foci and interests. Some cognitive linguists are primarily 
concerned with elucidating the cognitive mechanisms and principles that might account 
for the properties of grammar, as Ronald Langacker does in his highly detailed theory 
Cognitive Grammar, and as Leonard Talmy does in developing his model. Others are 
primarily concerned with characterizing and delineating the linguistic units or construc-
tions that populate a grammar; theories of this kind are called construction grammars. 
Finally, cognitive linguists who focus on grammatical change set out to explain the 
process of grammaticalization, whereby open-class elements gradually transform into 
closed-class elements. h ese dif erent paths of investigation are united by certain shared 
assumptions, which we very briel y set out in this section. We thus identify the two 
guiding principles that underpin a cognitive approach to grammar (as we see them).
Cognitive approaches to grammar assume a cognitive semantics, and build a model 
of linguistic knowledge (‘grammar’) which is consistent with the assumptions and 
i ndings of work in cognitive semantics. In addition to this, the two guiding principles 
of cognitive approaches to grammar are:
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i)  h e symbolic thesis.
ii)  h e usage-based thesis.
6.1 The symbolic thesis
h e symbolic thesis holds that the fundamental unit of grammar is a form-mean-
ing pairing, or linguistic unit (called a ‘symbolic assembly’ in Langacker’s Cognitive 
Grammar, or a ‘construction’ in construction grammar approaches). In Langacker’s 
terms, the symbolic unit has two poles: a semantic pole (its meaning) and a phonological 
pole (its sound). h e idea that language has an essentially symbolic function, and that 
the fundamental unit of grammar is the symbolic unit, has its roots in Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s (1857–1913) theory of language. Central to Saussure’s theory was the view 
that language is a symbolic system in which the linguistic expression (sign) consists of 
a mapping between a concept (signii ed) and an acoustic signal (signii er), where both 
signii ed and signii er are psychological entities. While there are important dif erences 
between Saussure’s work and the approach taken in cognitive linguistics, the cognitive 
approach adopts the idea of the Saussurean symbol. In cognitive approaches the semantic 
pole corresponds to the ‘signii ed’, and the phonological pole to the ‘signii er’. h ese are 
both ‘psychological entities’ in the sense that they belong within the mental system of 
linguistic knowledge (the ‘grammar’) in the mind of the speaker. 7
It follows that cognitive approaches to grammar are not restricted to investigating 
aspects of grammatical structure, largely independently of meaning, as is ot en the case 
in formal traditions. Instead, cognitive approaches to grammar encompass the entire 
inventory of linguistic units dei ned as form-meaning pairings. h ese run the gamut 
from skeletal syntactic coni gurations such as the ditransitive construction (expressed in 
John baked Mary a cake) to idioms (like kick the bucket), to bound morphemes like the 
–er sui  x, to words. h is entails that the received view of clearly distinct ‘sub-modules’ 
of language cannot be meaningfully upheld within cognitive linguistics, where the 
boundary between cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar is less 
clearly dei ned. Instead, meaning and grammar are seen as mutually interdependent 
and complementary. To take a cognitive approach to grammar is to study the units of 
language, and hence the language system itself. To take a cognitive approach to semantics 
is to attempt to understand how this linguistic system relates to the conceptual system, 
which in turn relates to embodied experience.
h e adoption of the symbolic thesis has an important consequence for cognitive 
approaches to grammar. Because the basic unit is the linguistic or symbolic unit, mean-
ing achieves central status. h at is, as the basic grammatical unit is a symbolic unit, 
then form cannot be studied independently of meaning. h is entails that the study of 
grammar, from a cognitive perspective, is the study of the full range of units that make 
up a language, from the lexical to the grammatical. For example, cognitive linguists argue 
that the grammatical form of a sentence is paired with its own (schematic) meaning 
in the same way that words like cat represent pairings of form and (content) meaning. 
h e idea that grammatical units are inherently meaningful is an important theme 
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in cognitive approaches to grammar, and gives rise to the idea of a lexicon-grammar 
continuum, in which content words like cat and grammatical constructions like the 
passive or the ditransitive both count as symbolic units, but dif er in terms of the quality 
of the meaning potential associated with them.
6.2 The usage-based thesis
h e usage-based thesis holds that the mental grammar of the speaker (his or her knowl-
edge of language) is formed by the abstraction of symbolic units from situated instances 
of language use. An important consequence of adopting the usage-based thesis is that 
there is no principled distinction between knowledge of language and use of language 
(competence and performance, in generative terms), since knowledge of language is 
knowledge of how language is used. h e usage-based thesis is central not just to cogni-
tive approaches to grammar but approaches to both language change and language 
acquisition which take a cognitive linguistic perspective, as represented by articles by 
Tomasello (2000/this volume) and by Crot  (1996/this volume).
7 Major theories and approaches
In this section we consider some of the major theoretical approaches in cognitive lin-
guistics which focus on language as a system of knowledge (‘grammar’). h e ultimate 
objective of a cognitive theory of grammar is to model speaker-hearer knowledge of 
language in ways that are consistent with the two key commitments underlying the cog-
nitive linguistics enterprise, the Generalization and Cognitive commitments discussed 
earlier. From this perspective, language emerges from general cognitive mechanisms 
and processes.
7.1 Talmy’s grammatical vs. lexical sub-systems approach
h e model of grammar developed by Leonard Talmy (e.g., Talmy, 2000, Chapter 1/this 
volume), assumes the symbolic thesis and, like other cognitive approaches to grammar, 
views grammatical units as inherently meaningful. However, Talmy’s model is distin-
guished by its emphasis on the qualitative distinction between grammatical (closed-class) 
and lexical (open-class) elements. Indeed, Talmy argues that these two forms of linguistic 
expression represent two distinct conceptual subsystems, which encode qualitatively 
distinct aspects of the human conceptual system. h ese are the grammatical subsystem 
and the lexical subsystem. For Talmy, while closed-class elements encode schematic or 
structural meaning, open-class elements encode meanings that are far richer in terms 
of content. In his research output Talmy is primarily interested in delineating the nature 
and organization of the grammatical subsystem. In particular, Talmy is concerned with 
establishing the nature and function of the conceptual structure subsystem, which is to 
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say the conceptual structure encoded by closed class elements. For Talmy this issue is 
a particularly fascinating one as in principle, language could function with a lexical or 
conceptual content system alone. h e fact that languages do not makes establishing the 
distinction in terms of the respective contributions of the two subsystems in encoding 
and externalizing our cognitive representation(s) a particularly fascinating one. Because 
Talmy assumes the bifurcation of the conceptual system into two distinct subsystems, 
his cognitive model of grammar focuses more on the closed-class system than it does 
on the open-class system.
According to Talmy, the closed-class subsystem is semantically restricted and has a 
structuring function, while the open-class system is semantically unrestricted and has the 
function of providing conceptual content. To illustrate the restricted nature of the closed-
class system, Talmy observes that while many languages have nominal inl ections that 
indicate number, no language has nominal inl ections that indicate colour. For example, 
many languages have a grammatical ai  x like plural -s in English, but no language has 
a grammatical ai  x designating, say, redness. Furthermore, the grammatical system 
rel ects a restricted range of concepts within the relevant domain. For example, the gram-
matical number system can rel ect concepts like singular, plural or paucal (meaning 
‘a few’) but not concepts like millions or twenty-seven. Talmy accounts for such 
restrictions by means of the observation that grammatical categories display topological 
rather than Euclidean properties. In other words, the meaning encoded by closed-class 
elements remains constant despite contextual dif erences relating to size, shape and so 
on. For example, the demonstrative determiner that in the expressions that book in your 
hand and that city encodes distance from the speaker regardless of the expanse of 
that distance. As these examples illustrate, the function of the grammatical/closed-class 
system is to provide a ‘pared-down’ or highly abstract conceptual structure. h is structure 
provides a ‘scaf old’ or a ‘skeleton’ over which elements from the lexical/open-class system 
are laid in order to provide rich and specii c conceptual content.
Talmy argues that while no inventory of concepts expressible by open-class forms 
can ever be specii ed (because there is no limit to human experience, knowledge and 
understanding), there is a restricted inventory of concepts expressible by closed-class 
forms. Each individual language has access to this inventory, but it does not follow that 
any given language will exploit all the available possibilities. h us, one of the major 
impulses behind Talmy’s work is to provide a descriptively adequate account of the major 
semantic content associated with the grammatical subsystem. He does this by identifying 
what he refers to as schematic systems within which closed-class elements appear to 
cluster. h ese systems include (at least) a coni gurational system, an attentional system, 
a perspectival system and a force-dynamics system. h us, Talmy’s approach represents 
an attempt to characterize that aspect of our cognitive representation that is encoded 
by the closed-class subsystem, and to describe how that system is organized.
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7.2 Cognitive Grammar
Cognitive Grammar is the theoretical framework that has been under development by 
Ronald Langacker since the mid 1970s, and is best represented in his two Foundations 
of Cognitive Grammar volumes published in 1987 and 1991. h is is also arguably the 
most detailed and comprehensive theory of grammar to have been developed within 
cognitive linguistics, and to date has been the most inl uential.
Langacker’s approach attempts to model the cognitive mechanisms and principles 
that motivate and license the formation and use of symbolic units of varying degrees 
of complexity. Like Talmy, Langacker argues that grammatical or closed-class units are 
inherently meaningful. Unlike Talmy, he does not assume that open-class and closed-
class units represent distinct conceptual subsystems.
Instead, Langacker argues that both types of unit belong within a single structured 
inventory of conventionalized linguistic units which represents knowledge of language 
in the mind of the speaker. Accordingly, Langacker’s model of grammar has a rather 
broader focus than Talmy’s.
For Langacker, knowledge of language (the mental grammar) is represented in the 
mind of the speaker as an inventory of symbolic units (Langacker, 1987, p. 73). It is only 
once an expression has been used sui  ciently frequently and has become entrenched 
(acquiring the status of a habit or a cognitive routine) that it becomes a unit. From this 
perspective, a unit is a symbolic entity that is not built compositionally by the language 
system but is stored and accessed as a whole. Furthermore, the symbolic units repre-
sented in the speaker’s grammar are conventional. h e conventionality of a linguistic unit 
relates to the idea that linguistic expressions become part of the grammar of a language 
by virtue of being shared among members of a speech community. h us conventionality 
is a matter of degree. For instance, an expression like dog is more conventional (shared by 
more members of the English-speaking community) than an expression like allophone, 
which is shared only by a subset of English speakers with specialist knowledge relating 
to the study of linguistics. h e role of entrenchment and conventionality in this model 
of grammar emerge from the usage-based thesis (see Langacker, 2000, for detailed 
discussion; see also Evans & Green, 2006, Chapter 4, for a review).
Symbolic units can be simplex or complex in terms of their symbolic structure. 
For example, a simplex symbolic unit like a morpheme may have a complex semantic 
or phonological structure, but is simplex in terms of symbolic structure if it does not 
contain smaller symbolic units as subparts. h e word dog and the plural marker -s 
are examples of simplex symbolic units. Complex units vary according to the level of 
complexity, from words (for example, dogs) and phrases (for example, John’s brown dog) 
to whole sentences (for example, Geof  kicked the dog). Langacker refers to complex 
symbolic units as constructions.
h e repository of entrenched symbolic units is conceived by Langacker as a mental 
inventory. Yet, the contents of this inventory are not stored in a random way. h e 
inventory is structured, and this structure lies in the relationships that hold between 
the units. For example, some units form subparts of other units which in turn form 
subparts of other units (for example, morphemes make up words and words make up 
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phrases which in turn make up sentences). h is set of interlinking and overlapping 
relationships is conceived as a network.
h ere are three kinds of relation that hold between members of the network: (i) 
symbolization–the symbolic links between semantic pole and phonological pole; (ii) 
categorization–for example, the link between the expressions rose and l ower, given that 
rose is a member of the category flower; and (3) integration (the relation between 
parts of a complex symbolic structure like l ower-s).
As a constraint on the model, Langacker (1987, pp. 53–54) proposes the content 
requirement. h is requirement holds that the only structures permissible within the 
grammar of a language are (i) phonological, semantic and symbolic units; (ii) the rela-
tions that hold between them (described above); and (iii) schemas that represent these 
units. h is requirement excludes abstract rules from the model. Instead, knowledge of 
linguistic patterns is conceived in terms of schemas.
7.3 Constructional approaches to grammar
Constructional approaches to grammar are based on the observation that the meaning 
of a whole utterance is more than a combination of the words it contains – the meaning 
of the whole is more than the meaning of the parts (Lakof , 1977). h ere are (at least) 
four main varieties of constructional approach to grammar. h e i rst is the theory called 
Construction Grammar that was developed by Charles Fillmore, Paul Kay and their col-
leagues (e.g., Fillmore et al., 1988/this volume). While this theory is broadly generative 
in orientation, it set the scene for the development of cognitively realistic theories of 
construction grammar which adopted the central thesis of Fillmore and Kay’s approach. 
h is thesis is the position that grammar can be modelled in terms of constructions rather 
than ‘words and rules’. In part, Construction Grammar is motivated by the fact that 
certain complex grammatical constructions (e.g. idioms like kick the bucket or throw 
in the towel) have meaning that cannot be predicted on the basis of their sub-parts and 
might therefore be ‘stored whole’ rather than ‘built from scratch’.
We also briel y introduce three other constructional approaches that are set 
i rmly within the cognitive linguistics framework: (1) a model that we call Goldberg’s 
Construction Grammar, developed by Adele Goldberg (e.g., 1995, 2003/this volume); 
(2) Radical Construction Grammar, developed by William Crot  (e.g., 1996/this volume, 
2001); and (3) Embodied Construction Grammar, a recent approach developed by 
Benjamin Bergen and Nancy Chang (2005/this volume). It is worth pointing out that 
Cognitive Grammar could also be classii ed as a constructional approach to grammar 
because Langacker also adopts a constructional view of certain types of grammatical 
unit. However, Langacker dei nes the notion of a construction in a dif erent way from 
these models.
Cognitive Grammar and constructional approaches to grammar share another 
feature in common. Both are inventory-based approaches to the study of grammar 
(Evans & Green, 2006). In other words, both types of approach view the grammar as an 
inventory of symbolic units rather than a system of rules or principles. h is amounts to 
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the claim that the language system does not work predominantly by ‘building’ structure 
(as in generative models of grammar) but by ‘storing’ it.
Fillmore et al.’s Construction Grammar
In their 1988 paper (this volume), Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor argue in favour of 
a model in which, like the lexical item, the complex grammatical construction (the 
phrase or the clause), has semantic and pragmatic properties directly associated with 
it. To illustrate they examine formal idioms, complex expressions which have syntax 
that is unique to the complex construction of which it is part. In principle, the number 
of instances of a formal idiom constructions is ini nitely large. Despite this, such con-
structions ot en have a clearly identii able semantic value and pragmatic force. For this 
reason, formal idioms pose a particularly interesting challenge to the ‘words and rules’ 
model of grammar. h ey are productive and therefore rule-based, yet ot en defy the 
‘usual’ rules of grammar. Fillmore et al. therefore took as their case study the idiomatic 
let alone construction.
In light of their i ndings concerning the let alone construction, Fillmore et al. argue 
against the ‘words and rules’ view (which they call the ‘atomistic’ view) of grammatical 
operations, where lexical items are assembled by phrase structure rules into complex 
units that are then assigned compositional meaning and only subsequently subjected 
to pragmatic processing. In other words, they argue against a modular view of the 
language system. Instead of a model in which syntactic, semantic, phonological and 
pragmatic knowledge is represented in encapsulated subsystems, the constructional 
model proposes that all this information is represented in a single unii ed representation, 
which is the construction.
In later work, for example Kay and Fillmore (1999), Fillmore, Kay and their collabo-
rators develop their theory of Construction Grammar further. h is model is monostratal: 
containing only one level of syntactic representation rather than a sequence of structures 
linked by transformations, a feature that characterizes transformational generative 
models like Principles and Parameters h eory. Furthermore, the representations in 
Construction Grammar contain not only syntactic information but also semantic 
information relating to argument structure as well as pragmatic information.
Goldberg’s Construction Grammar
h e contribution of Fillmore et al. (1988) and Kay and Fillmore (1999) in developing 
Construction Grammar was to establish the symbolic thesis from i rst principles. h ese 
researchers observed that the ‘words and rules’ approach to grammar, while accounting 
for much that is regular in language, had failed to account for the irregular, which repre-
sents a signii cant subset of language. h ey then set out to explain the irregular i rst, on 
the assumption that once principles have been developed that account for the irregular, 
then the same principles should be able to explain the regular as trivial cases.
h e next stage in developing the constructional perspective was to apply this 
approach to what is regular in the grammar. Perhaps the most important develop-
ment in this area has been Adele Goldberg’s work, most notably her landmark 1995 
book, Constructions (see also Goldberg, 2003/this volume). In this work Goldberg 
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developed a theory of construction grammar that sought to extend the constructional 
approach from ‘irregular’ idiomatic constructions to ‘regular’ constructions. In order 
to do this, she focused on verb argument constructions. In other words, she examined 
‘ordinary’ sentences, like ones with transitive or ditransitive structure, and built a theory 
of construction grammar for the argument structure patterns she found there. One of 
Goldberg’s notable achievements, in addition to making a compelling case for the con-
structional approach to verbal argument structure, was in showing that ‘sentence-level’ 
constructions exhibit the same sorts of phenomena as other linguistic units including 
polysemy and metaphor relations and extensions.
Radical Construction Grammar
h e Radical Construction Grammar model was developed by Crot  (1996/this volume, 
2001), and sets out to explore the implications of linguistic typology for syntactic theory. 
Linguistic typology is the subdiscipline of linguistics that examines the structural prop-
erties of language from a crosslinguistic perspective and describes patterns of similarity 
as well as observing points of diversity. Although typological studies can in principle be 
theory neutral, relying on large-scale comparisons and statistical i ndings, explanations 
for the patterns observed are usually couched in functional terms. Functional typology is 
in a number of ways compatible with the approach adopted by cognitive linguists, and 
it is this link that Crot  seeks to exploit in developing a model of language that marries 
typological insights with a meaning-based model of language structure.
Crot  argues that instead of taking grammatical universals across the world’s lan-
guages as a starting point and building a model of language that assumes a universal 
grammar (the formal approach), we should instead take grammatical diversity as a 
starting point and build a model that accounts adequately for patterns of typological 
variation. Crot  argues that a constructional approach is best placed to provide this 
type of model, since a constructional approach enables the articulation of the arbitrary 
and the unique, in contrast to most formal approaches which place the emphasis on 
generalization.
What makes Crot ’s constructional approach ’radical’ emerges as a consequence 
of the typological stance he adopts. In Crot ’s theory, the existence of constructions is 
the only primitive theoretical construct. All other linguistic elements, including word 
classes, such as nouns and verbs, word order patterns, and grammatical relations such 
as subject and object are epiphenomenal. In this way, the notion of syntax, as usually 
understood, is eradicated from the picture altogether.
Embodied Construction Grammar
Embodied Construction Grammar (ECG) is a recent theory of construction grammar 
developed by Benjamin Bergen and Nancy Chang, together with various collaborators. 
In this model, the emphasis is on language processing, particularly language compre-
hension or understanding. In other words, while the approaches we have discussed 
thus far place the emphasis on modelling linguistic knowledge rather than on on-line 
processing, the ECG model takes it for granted that constructions form the basis of 
linguistic knowledge, and focuses on exploring how constructions are processed in 
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on-line or dynamic language comprehension. Moreover, ECG is centrally concerned with 
describing how the constructions of a given language relate to embodied knowledge in 
the process of language understanding. h erefore much of the research to date in ECG 
has been focused on developing a formal ‘language’ to describe the constructions of a 
language like English; this formal language also needs to be able to describe the embod-
ied concepts that these constructions give rise to in dynamic language comprehension. 
For further details see Bergen and Chang (2005/this volume).
7.4 Cognitive approaches to grammaticalization
h e i nal group of theories that we mention, albeit briel y, are cognitive approaches to 
grammaticalization: the process of language change whereby grammatical or closed-class 
elements evolve gradually from the open-class system. Because it relates to language 
change, the process of grammaticalization falls within the domain of historical linguis-
tics. Grammaticalization is also of interest to typologists (see Crot , 1996/this volume), 
because patterns of language change can inform their explanations of current patterns 
in language. A subset of these historical linguists and typologists have developed models 
that are informed by cognitive linguistics, which attempt to explain the grammaticaliza-
tion process. See in particular Heine et al. (1991), Sweetser (1990) and Traugott and 
Dasher (2002).
8 Empirical approaches in cognitive linguistics
A criticism that has been levelled against cognitive linguistics, particularly early on 
in the development of the enterprise, related to a perceived lack of empirical rigour. 
h is criticism arose in response to some of the early foundational studies conducted 
under the banner of cognitive semantics. For example, while intuitively appealing, 
early research on lexical polysemy networks (see Brugman & Lakof , 1988) and early 
research on conceptual metaphors (Lakof  & Johnson, 1980) was largely based on 
speaker intuition and interpretation. h e studies on over by Brugman ([1981] 1988; 
Brugman & Lakof , 1988) and Lakof  (1987), for instance, were criticized for lacking a 
clear set of methodological decision principles (see Sandra, 1998), particularly given 
semantic network analyses of the same lexical item ot en dif ered quite radically from 
one theorist to another (see Sandra & Rice, 1995, for a review). In recent years, the 
empirical foundations of cognitive linguistics have become stronger. For example, 
experimental research (e.g., Gibbs, 1994; Boroditsky, 2000) and discourse analytic 
research (e.g., Musolf , 2004; Zinken et al., in press) have begun to provide an empirical 
basis for drawing conclusions about conceptual metaphor. Research by Seana Coulson 
(e.g. Coulson & Van Petten, 2002/this volume) has begun to provide an empirical basis 
for assessing conceptual integration networks. Research by psycholinguists Sandra and 
Rice (1995) and Cuyckens et al. (1997/this volume), together with cognitively oriented 
corpus studies as illustrated by Gries (2005) have begun to strengthen the empirical 
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basis of cognitive approaches to lexical semantics, and research by Tyler and Evans 
(e.g. 2001/this volume), among others, has begun to provide a sound theoretical and 
methodological basis for investigating lexical polysemy. Finally, experimental work in 
the area of mental simulation (Zwaan et al., 2002; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Bergen, 
to appear) of ers experimental coni rmation of the role of mental imagery in the con-
struction of sentential meaning. With respect to cognitive approaches to grammar, 
William Crot ’s (e.g. 1996/this volume, 2001) proposals concerning the integration of 
typological methods with cognitive linguistic theory has strengthened the empirical 
basis of constructional accounts of grammar.
Indeed, the last few years have witnessed an increase in the inl uence of empirical 
methods from neighbouring disciplines upon cognitive linguistics, including brain-
scanning techniques from experimental psychology. h e increased concern with 
empirical methods is attested by Gonzales-Marquez et al. (to appear), a collection of 
papers emerging from a recent workshop entitled ‘Empirical Methods in Cognitive 
Linguistics’.
Despite these advances, outstanding challenges remain. For example, Gibbs (2000, 
p. 349) observes that many psychologists complain that work in cognitive linguistics 
that attempts to infer ‘aspects of conceptual knowledge from an analysis of systematic 
patterns of linguistic structure leads to theories that appear to have a post hoc quality’. 
In other words, psychologists have argued that cognitive linguistic theories are not 
predictive but assume without adequate evidence that the conceptual system has certain 
properties in order to account for the properties of language.
For example, Blending h eory purports to be a theory about conceptual processes 
but is forced to posit underlying mental spaces and integration networks in order to 
account for linguistic expressions. In other words, it infers the conceptual structures that 
it attempts to demonstrate evidence for rather than seeking independent evidence for 
these conceptual structures (from psychology or psycholinguistics, for example). h is 
means that the theory cannot be empirically falsii ed, since it does not make predictions 
about the properties of conceptual structure that can be empirically tested. Falsii ability 
is a necessary property of any theory that seeks to achieve scientii c rather that purely 
ideological status. Accordingly, if cognitive linguistic accounts of conceptual structure 
are to achieve a theoretical status beyond ideology, it will be necessary for them to 
continue to develop the means by which they can be empirically tested.
9 Achievements of the cognitive linguistics enterprise
In this i nal section we briel y review some of the most signii cant achievements of the 
cognitive linguistics enterprise, as we see them.
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9.1 An integrated view of language and thought
h e Generalization Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment, the two key commit-
ments which underpin a cognitive linguistics approach, have given rise to an integrated 
approach to linguistic and conceptual organization. h is has been particularly evident in 
cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar, the two areas we have focused 
upon in this review article. Other areas, such as cognitive approaches to phonology, 
cognitive approaches to pragmatics and applications of cognitive linguistics to areas 
such as psycholinguistics and language teaching, while increasingly the focus of research 
in cognitive linguistics, remain at this point less well developed.
9.2 Re-examination of the empiricist thesis
h e rationalist view that underpins generative approaches to language has dominated 
the i eld of linguistics for over half a century. A notable achievement of the cognitive 
linguistics enterprise has been to refocus interest on the empiricist perspective, and 
thus to reopen channels of investigation into language and mind that take into account 
embodiment, experience and usage while remaining i rmly committed to the study of 
cognitive structures and processes.
9.3 Focus on conceptual phenomena
Cognitive linguistics has also contributed to extending the range of conceptual phenomena 
studied by cognitive scientists. For example, the idea of conceptual projection or ‘map-
pings’, which is addressed by the frameworks of Conceptual Metaphor h eory, Mental 
Spaces h eory and Conceptual Blending h eory, attempts to model the richness and 
complexity of the human imagination. Until relatively recently, it was assumed either that 
the human imagination was peripheral to cognition or that it could not be systematically 
studied. h e cognitive linguistics enterprise has provided an approach for studying the 
imagination, and has shown that language reveals systematic processes at work in human 
imagination which cognitive linguists have argued are central to the way we think.
9.4 Integration of formalist and functionalist concerns
A further achievement of the cognitive linguistics enterprise has been to integrate formal-
ist and functionalist concerns. While formalists are particularly concerned with develop-
ing descriptively adequate accounts of linguistic phenomena and with modelling the 
representation of knowledge of language in the mind, functionalists have been primarily 
concerned with exploring the social and communicative functions of situated language 
use. Cognitive linguistics, while functionalist in spirit, is concerned both with achieving 
descriptive adequacy and with modelling language as a cognitive phenomenon.
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9.5 A fi nal caveat
Despite these achievements, there remain, of course, other kinds of challenges for 
the cognitive linguistics enterprise. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the detailed 
and precise claims made by cognitive linguists about conceptual organization, e.g., 
conceptual metaphors, are largely based on the properties of language and are therefore, 
for the most part, inferential. Until we learn a good deal more about the human mind 
and brain, this remains a sobering caveat for any theory that attempts to model the 
cognitive representation of language.
Notes
1 We are grateful to Michael Israel, George Lakof  and Chris Sinha for helpful comments 
on an earlier drat  of this paper.
2 For a review of historical antecedents of cognitive linguistics see Nerlich and Clarke (in 
press).
3 h is applies to the history of cognitive linguistics in the English-speaking academic 
world. It adds to the importance of cognitive linguistics as a new ‘paradigm’ to note 
that cognitive linguistic theories with very similar commitments were independently 
being developed around the same time in other academic discourses, e.g., in countries 
where the language of international scientii c discourse is Russian (see, for example, 
Bartmiński, 1993).
4 Cognitive linguistics has by now been applied to a wide range of areas, including 
non-verbal communication (e.g., gesture, sign language(s)), and applied linguistics 
(including literature, and language teaching/pedagogy), as well as a by now bewildering 
array of disciplines in the social and cognitive sciences, and humanities. Considera-
tion of such applications and areas is clearly beyond the scope of this review article, 
which is primarily concerned with the theoretical and ideological underpinnings of 
the enterprise and a review of some of the notable theoretical approaches. For a fuller 
review, and copious references to some of the applications to which cognitive linguistic 
theories have been put, see Evans and Green (2006).
5 h is centrality of meaning for cognitive linguistics is another way in which this enter-
prise is necessarily ‘cognitive’, as pointed out by Talmy (2000).
6 One objection that has been levelled at cognitive semantics is that some proponents 
appear to straightforwardly equate semantic structure with conceptual structure (see 
Levinson, 1997, for a critical appraisal of such a view). As Sinha (1999) observes, such 
a position, if accepted, would be deeply problematic. Recent work, such as the theory 
of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models, developed by Evans (e.g., 2006) argues for 
a level of semantic structure, ‘lexical concepts’, which are distinct from conceptual 
structure.
7 Note that the adoption of such a bi-polar semiotic model is not an intrinsic, but a his-
torical aspect of cognitive linguistic research. In fact, many cognitive linguists argue for 
a ‘triangular’ semiotics that can model the grounding of linguistic meaning construc-
tion in the intersubjectively shared world (e.g., Sinha, in press).
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